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Abstract 
This paper investigates the joint effect of consumers' environmental concerns and product-market 
competition on firms’ decisions whether to innovate “clean” or “dirty”. We first develop a step-by-
step innovation model to capture the basic intuition that socially responsible consumers induce firms 
to escape competition by pursuing greener innovations. To test and quantify the theory, we bring 
together patent data, survey data on environmental values, and competition measures. Using a panel 
of 8,562 firms from the automobile sector that patented in 42 countries between 1998 and 2012, we 
indeed find that greater exposure to environmental attitudes has a significant positive effect on the 
probability for a firm to innovate in the clean direction, and all the more so the higher the degree of 
product market competition. Results suggest that the combination of historically realistic increases in 
prosocial attitudes and product market competition can have the same effect on green innovation as 
major increase in fuel prices. 
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1 Introduction
Should private firms get involved in mitigating climate change and other environmental
problems? A traditional view against such corporate activism (Friedman 1970) is that
firms should concentrate on achieving their economic objectives –starting with profit
maximization– and let governments and/or markets, through regulations and contracts,
deal with the associated externalities. In practice, however, we often see governments
dragging their feet or being ineffective when it comes to implementing policies that
effectively address environmental problems. Bénabou and Tirole (2010) discuss both
the sources of these limitations (capture by interest groups, territoriality of jurisdic-
tion, transaction and information costs) and how, together with prosocial and image
motivations, they create a scope for individual and corporate “social responsibility”.
A case in point is that of carbon taxes, which no single government has a strong
incentive to implement since climate is a global issue, and which are often unpopular
even with electorates that otherwise proclaim their “greenness”. In France, for instance,
the “yellow vests” movement was triggered by a modest increase in fuel and gasoline
taxes. It then falls upon intrinsically motivated consumers, investors and firms to “do
their part” through other channels, with reputationally motivated ones following suit.
Similar trends are at work with the rise of “sustainable” and “fair trade” products,
“ethical” investment funds, and the like.
Our focus in this paper is on firms’ incentives to “innovate clean”, and on the ex-
tent to which citizen’s environmental concerns can be effective in shaping investment
decisions.1 We argue, both theoretically and empirically, that product-market compe-
tition amplifies firms’ response to citizens’ demand for greater social responsibility, and
that this complementarity has important consequences. Intuitively, firms will pursue
greener innovations when facing more environmentally motivated customers, and the
more so, the harder they have to compete for them.
The standard, static effect of greater product-market competition is to increases con-
sumer surplus, by reducing (quality-adjusted) prices. From a dynamic point of view, it
can also encourage innovation by firms, as a means to try and escape price competition
1Citizens could also directly contribute to environmental NGO’s, but it may be more efficient to
“delegate” some of their socially responsible preferences to firms, who have knowledge to directly
affect outcomes. Moreover, enhancing one’s social image may be more effectively achieved through
the choice of consumption items (e.g., by purchasing greener cars) than through writing checks to
charitable causes: the latter tends to be less visible except for the very rich, who make huge and
well-publicized donations.
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(Aghion et al., 2001; Aghion et al., 2005). The novelty of the paper is to introduce
both environmental externalities and social-responsibility concerns over them into the
analysis. While the direct impact of competition on the environment is always nega-
tive – lower prices induce more mass consumption and therefore more pollution2– the
dynamic incentive can mitigate and even reverse it. Indeed, what matters here is not
so much the effect of competition on the level of innovation, but rather how it affects
its direction, namely the extent to which firms’ R&D and product mixes become more,
or less, environmentally friendly.
In the first part of the paper, we develop a simple step-by-step innovation model with
green innovation. The economy is populated by representative agents who care about
both the level and the environmental “footprint” of their own consumption bundle.
There is a continuum of differentiated goods, such as cars, appliances, etc., and the
production and/or consumption of each unit generates a certain amount of pollution,
determined by the technology embodied in the good by its producer. Producing cleaner
goods, or producing more cleanly, requires green innovation and therefore adequate
R&D investments. We then analyze how consumers’ environmental-responsibility con-
cerns and the degree of competition between firms combine to shape: (i) the equilib-
rium amount of clean R&D, and hence the kinds of goods consumed; (ii) total emissions
or externalities; (iii) ultimately, net social welfare. While more competitive markets
tend to worsen pollution by forcing down prices and raising output, they also induce
more firms to innovate green, in order to escape direct price competition with their
rivals. Due to these offsetting quantity and quality effects, the impact of competition
on total emissions is shown to have a hump-shaped profile that we fully character-
ize, identifying in particular the conditions under which high versus low competition
is pollution-minimizing. We furthermore show that social responsibility and competi-
tion have complementary effects in spurring green innovation, and that this positive
interaction is also reflected in the equilibrium-emissions profile, which becomes more
“competition friendly” (or, less unfriendly) as consumers’ environmental concerns in-
tensify.
In the second part of the paper, we bring together patent data, survey data on envi-
ronmental values, and competition measures to test empirically the model’s key com-
2The examples of China or India today, or of the increasing market share of SUV everywhere since
the 1980s, are quite illustrative in that respect. Another example is increasing worldwide competition
in the airline industry, resulting in increasing travel and emissions.
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parative statics. We relate the extent to which firms innovate in a clean direction
to firm-specific measures of exposure to pro-environmental attitudes and competition.
Our data covers 8,562 firms and 42 countries during the two periods of 1998-2002 and
2008-2012, with around 100,000 patents filed in the first period and 150,000 in the
second one. A firm’s exposure is defined as a weighted average of country-level mea-
sures of the corresponding variable, where the weights proxy for the importance of the
various countries to the firm. For competition, we also construct and use a firm-level,
Lerner-index-type measure of competition, but we can only do this for a sub-sample of
firms. We follow Aghion et al. (2016) in two respects: first, we focus primarily on the
automobile sector, where the distinction between clean and dirty patents is both easy
to make and highly relevant; second, the weights mentioned above are computed using
the firm’s patenting activity between 1950 and 1995, i.e. before our period of analysis.
This is based on the assumption that firms are more likely to take out patent protection
in a particular market the more that market is important to them. We also check ro-
bustness to alternative weights definition. Our main findings are that pro-environment
attitudes have a significant positive effect on the probability for a firm to patent more
in the clean direction and that this is effect is stronger the higher competition is. In
particular, our empirical analysis suggests that the combination of realistic increases
in prosocial attitudes and in product market competition can have the same effect on
green innovation as an 40% increase in fuel prices worldwide.
Our research relates to several strands of literature. The first one is the literature on
competition and innovation (e.g. see Aghion, Harris and Vickers, 1997; Aghion et al,
2001; Aghion et al, 2005; Vives, 2008). We contribute to this literature by bringing
environmental externalities and social responsibility concerns, and by analyzing how
the latter interact with product market competition. Second, is the literature on
growth and the environment pioneered by Nordhaus (1994)3. Most relevant here is
the work on endogenous directed technical change and the environment (e.g. Newell,
Jaffe and Stavins, 1999; Popp 2002; Acemoglu et al., 2012, Aghion et al., 2016)
that analyzes how firms’ incentives to invest in green innovation are shaped by public
policy, such as carbon taxes and/or subsidies to green innovation. Our paper brings
in individuals’ willingness to “do their part” through their own consumption choices,
which becomes essential when such policy-making is deficient. Third, there is the
literature on individual and corporate social responsibility, which both arise from a
3See also Nordhaus (2002), Stern (2007) and Weitzman (2007, 2009),
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mix of intrinsic and reputational motivations (e.g., Bénabou and Tirole 2010, 2011;
Hart and Zingales 2019 and many empirical references in these papers). We contribute
to this literature by introducing product market competition as a channel through
which consumers’ social preferences can influence firms’ investment decisions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical analysis. Section
3 discusses the empirical strategy and data sources. Section 4 presents the empirical
results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Basic model
In this section, we develop a step-by-step innovation model with environmental inno-
vations. Time is discrete, with both individuals and firms living for one period. At the
beginning of each period t, firms choose R&D investments (e.g., hiring researchers),
aiming to innovate and thereby maximize their expected end-of-period profits. Once
innovations have realized, firms produce with their respective technologies, competing
for consumers who care about both the prices and the environmental impact of the
goods they buy. Revenues are paid out as wages to production and R&D workers, and
net profits are redistributed to consumers, who are also the firms’ shareholders.
2.1 Preferences
There is a continuum of differentiated good, such as cars and trucks of various designs,
appliances, etc., indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Within and/or across these sectors, firms po-
tentially differ both by the price they charge and the environmental (un)friendliness
of the goods they produce. The production or consumption of one unit of good with
environmental quality q thus generates x = 1/q units of emissions, or similar negative
externality.
The economy is populated by representative agents with standard taste-for-variety
preferences, but who are also concerned about their environmental “footprint”. Specif-
ically, we assume that an agent who buys yj,f units of quality qj,f from each firm f












is the individual’s “ethically-adjusted,” or emissions-impact discounted, consumption
of variety j. A few remarks are useful here.
First, these preferences embody a form of ethical motivation. An individual’s contribu-
tion to aggregate emissions is negligible, and in particular does not affect the quality of
the air (say) that he breathes; nonetheless, he intrinsically dislikes contributing to the
externality. He feels guilty, or/and socially embarrassed, about the carbon he emits
when driving or flying, and conversely is willing to pay a “virtue” premium for cleaner
goods. The parameter δ captures the extent of these social-responsibility concerns.
Second, while sectors are imperfect substitutes, within each of them firms’ quality-
adjusted offerings are perfect substitutes. Therefore, all demand for a variety j will
go to the firm(s) in Fj with the highest price/quality ratio, q/p. Furthermore, the
logarithmic form of preferences implies that, in equilibrium, the same amount will
be spent by consumers on each variety;4. we normalize it to 1, by choosing current
expenditure as the numeraire.5
Finally, (1) represents only the part of consumers’ utility that results from their con-
sumption choices. The disutility suffered from total emissions will come in subtraction
when analyzing welfare, but is taken by each individual as given.
2.2 Technology and market structure
Labor is the only input, with agents offering an infinitely elastic supply of it at a given
wage, normalized to 1. It takes c units of labor to produce one unit of output (e.g., one
car), with the firms’ current technology determining the associated emissions, 1/q. The
firm’s technological level, in turn, reflects the cumulative number of (green) innovations
it has made in the past, or successfully copied from someone who did: denoting this
number as kf ∈ N,
qf = γ
kf ,
4To see this, note that a consumer will choose the yj ’s to maximize u =
∫
ln yjdj subject to the
budget constraint
∫
pjyjdj = E, where E denotes current expenditures. The first-order condition is:
∂u/∂yj = 1/yj = λpj , for all j, where λ is a Lagrange multiplier. Together with the budget constraint,
this implies that pjyj = 1/λ = E for all j.
5See Grossman and Helpman (1991).
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where γ > 1 measures the size of a leading-edge environmental innovation. Recalling
that consumers value a quantity-quality combination (y, q) as yqδ, it thus effectively
takes cγ−δkf units of labor for a firm at technological level kf to produce one unit of
quality-adjusted output.
Suppose from here on that each sector j is constituted of a duopoly, f = A,B, plus
a “lagging” competitive fringe, as follows. First, in each period t both firms have free
access to the frontier technology achieved in period t − 1. These strong knowledge
spillovers considerably simplify the R&D problem, by limiting to a single period the
horizon over which investment costs can be recouped through rents.
Second, a firm’s R&D effort can result in at most one innovation over the current
frontier of the sector in which it operates: for any z ≤ 1, investing κz2/2 units of labor
ex ante yields a probability z of inventing a technology that is γ times cleaner, and a
complementary probability 1 − z of zero progress. We call z the “innovation rate” or
“R&D intensity” of the firm.
Together, these assumptions imply that the gap that can open between firms is at most
one innovation, |kB − kA| ∈ {0, 1}, and it resets to zero at the start of every period.
A third assumption made to further simplify the problem is that, at the innovation
stage (where kA = kB), only one (either) of of the two firms has an opportunity to
productively invest in R&D. The other lacks, in the current period, a suitable idea,
managerial capacity, access to specialized labor, etc., which effectively makes its κ
prohibitively large.
To summarize, given our set of assumptions there can, at any point in time, be only
be two kinds of sectors in the economy: (i) leveled or neck-and-neck sectors, where
the duopolists’ qualities are on par, and (ii) unleveled sectors, where a leader is one
step ahead of its competitor (laggard or follower).6 More precisely, at the start of each
period t, which corresponds to the investment phase, all sectors are neck and neck,
while during the subsequent production phase of that same period, a fraction z will be
unleveled, corresponding (by the law of large numbers) to the R&D intensity chosen
by investing firms.
In addition to the two firms active in each sector, there is also competitive fringe of
potential entrants. These firms will neither produce nor do research in equilibrium
6Aghion et al. (2001) and Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) analyzes the more general innovation
model (but without environmental concerns) where there is no limit to how far ahead the leader can
get. In such a setting (or, when followers can “leapfrog” ahead) additional effects arise, which we will
abstract from for simplicity.
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but act as a threat, disciplining the duopolists. We thus assume that, at the start of
each period t, the fringe has access, through free imitation, to the “previous-best” (not
“previous-period frontier”) technology, meaning one that embodies only the k′ = k− 1
previous innovations, where k = kA = kB is the level from which the duopolists start,
and may further innovate.
2.3 Competition and profits
Recall that, due to the preferences in (1), consumers will spend the same amount on
each variety. Firms within each sector thus compete for that fixed revenue, normalized
to 1.
Consider first market competition in an unleveled sector, where an innovation just
occurred. The leader has a quality advantage of γδ over the follower –its cars pollute
γ times less– so it can engage in limit pricing: by charging pM = γ
δc, it attracts all
consumers and captures the whole revenue “pie,” which is clearly optimal. The number











Consider now competition in a leveled (neck-and-neck) sector, where no innovation
recently occurred. If the two firms engage in unfettered (Bertrand) price competition,
the equilibrium price falls to c, resulting in zero profit for both. At the other extreme,
if they collude so effectively as to maximize their joint profits and share the proceeds,
they will act like the leader in an unleveled sector. Indeed, the limit price that can
be charged is now what will just keep out the competitive fringe, which can produce
goods that are γ times more polluting than those of the duopolists. The fully collusive
strategy will thus again involve p = cγδ = pM , and yield profits of πM/2 for each firm.
Following Aghion et al. (2005), we span the range between these two extremes by
representing (inverse) market competition as the extent to which two neck-and-neck
firms are able to collude at the production-and-sales stage. More precisely, we assume
that the normalized profit of each is:
πD(∆) ≡ (1−∆) πM ,
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where ∆ ∈ [1/2, 1] parametrizes the degree of product market competition.7 The
corresponding price and sectoral output are given by equating total profits to total
sales minus costs, 2 (1−∆) πM ≡ [p(∆)− c] y(∆) = 1− c/p(∆), so that
p(∆) =
c
1− 2 (1−∆) πM
=
c
1− 2 (1−∆) (1− γ−δ)

















For given technologies, competition (defined here as reduced collusion) has the standard
effect of forcing down the equilibrium price, which in turn increases consumer demand
and production. More units produced and sold, in turm, result in more emissions –the
mass-consumption effect. The other consequence of competition is to affect incentives
to innovate, to which we now turn.
2.4 Clean innovation and the “escape competition” effect
As explained earlier, each sector starts the current period with both firms being neck
and neck, then one of the two (say, at random) is endowed with an opportunity, or
idea, for engaging in R&D. If it invests z ≤ 1 to try and develop a cleaner technology,
it will succeed with probability z and then reap a leader’s operating profit πM ; with
probability 1− z it will fail and have to engage in price collusion with its equally able





zπM + (1− z) πD(∆)− κz2/2
}
,
resulting in z = min {(πM − πD(∆))/κ, 1}. We shall restrict attention to parameter
values such that κ > πM , or equivalently
κ > 1− 1
γδ
≡ κ1, (6)
meaning that innovations are not too “easy,” in terms of their importance or/and cost.












7We assume that collusion occurs only at the (ex-post) stage of production and pricing, and not
at the ex-ante stage of R&D, which for instance could be harder to monitor.
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Averaging across all sectors j ∈ [0, 1] the rate of R&D effort at the start of period t
is also the proportion of sectors where innovation will occur, so the aggregate flow of
clean innovations during the period is simply I = z(∆). Therefore:
Proposition 1. Both market competition and consumers’ social-responsibility concerns











Remark: One could extend this model by having both: clean and dirty innovation, for
example faster or bigger cars (e.g. SUV’s), or innovations that save on labor costs. Our
conjecture is that in this extended model, more competition, i.e. a higher ∆, would
generally enhance both types of innovation, but the proportion of clean would still rise
with prosocial values as well as their interaction with market competition.
2.5 Pollution
At the production (post-innovation stage) of each period t, there is a fraction z of
sectors in which one firm has succeeded in becoming cleaner by a factor γ than the
other, and a fraction 1 − z where the innovation effort has failed, so that both firms
still use period t − 1’s frontier technology. Market output is yM in the first case and
y(∆) in the second, so total emissions (normalized by total expenditure) equal:
X = [1− z(∆)] y(∆) + z(∆)yM/γ. (9)
























This is a concave second-degree polynomial in ∆, intuitively reflecting two opposing ef-
fects. On the one hand, by increasing equilibrium output y(∆) in neck-and-neck sectors,
competition directly increases pollution. This is the “China gets cars” effect. On the
other hand, the anticipation of lower profits in more competitive markets causes firms
to try and gain a monopolistic quality advantage, by increasing their clean-innovation
effort; as a result, a greater fraction z(∆) of sectors develop clean technologies, which
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tends to reduce emissions.8
Focusing first on the extremes of full competition and full collusion to get the main
intuitions, the former is less polluting than the latter if X(1) < X(1/2), which can be
simplified to









Note that κ2 > 1 − γ−δ = κ1. Quite intuitively, for any given κ, (11) holds when γ
or/and δ is large enough. More generally, we have:
Proposition 2. Assume κ > κ1, so that the optimal z(∆) is always interior. As
competition ∆ ∈ [1/2, 1] increases: (a) for κ < κ2 − κ1/2, aggregate pollution X(∆)
decreases monotonically; (b) for κ > κ2 + κ1/2, X(∆) increases monotonically; (c) for
κ ∈ (κ2− κ1/2, κ2 + κ1/2), X(∆) is hump-shaped; moreover, it is minimized at ∆ = 1
(versus ∆ = 1/2) if and only if κ < κ2; (d) For all κ in the nomempty interval [κ1, κ2],
aggregate pollution is minimized at ∆ = 1.
The proof is given in the Appendix, as is that for the next proposition, which analyzes
the effects of environmental values δ and their interaction with competition. Both sets
of results are illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Effect of competition and social values on pollution
















Proposition 3. Aggregate pollution X(∆) decreases with consumer’s social-responsibility
concern δ, and for all κ > κ1 (more generally, as long as R&D effort is interior) it
decreases more, the stronger is market competition: ∂2X/∂∆∂δ < 0.
8Conversely, a higher κ reduces z and thereby increases X.
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2.6 Welfare
Let us start by evaluating aggregate utility from consumption. In each period, there
are z relatively “green” varieties and 1 − z relatively “dirty” ones. Each individual
purchases yM of the former and y(∆) of the latter, so given their relative valuations by
consumers,
U = (1− z(∆)) ln y(∆) + z(∆) ln[γδyM ]. (12)
As expected, an increase in competition ∆ increases aggregate expected utility through
both a quantity and a quality effect. First, for fixed z it increases consumption y(∆)
of each neck-and-neck variety, by driving the price down. Second, it reallocates the
composition of the consumption basket towards cleaner varieties (by incentivizing firms
to develop them), which consumers prefer: since y(∆) < 1/c = γδyM for all ∆ < 1, an
increase in z(∆) raises U.
An increase in prosocial concerns, on the other hand, need not raise utility. On the one
hand, a higher δ means that consumers experience more disutility –e.g., guilt– from
each unit of pollution embodied in their consumption. On the other hand, a more
environmentally concerned population pushes firms to produce cleaner goods (albeit
more expensive ones). The latter effect can be shown, quite intuitively, to dominate
when competition is high enough. We show in the Appendix:
Proposition 4. (a) Aggregate utility is increasing in the degree of competition ∆; (b)
It increases with the strength of consumers’ environmental preferences δ if and only if
competition is strong enough, ∆ ≥ ∆U , with ∆U < 1 when κ < 1 + πM and ∆U < 1/2
when κ is below some κ̄(πM) < (1 + πM) ; 2 (c)If κ ≥ 2κ1, the effects of preferences
and competition are complementary, ∂2U/∂∆∂δ > 0.
Consumption utility is only one component of agents’ welfare, however: by definition,
the total pollution generated by production and/or consumption activities is a harmful
externality. Assuming an aggregate disutility linear in total emissions, net social welfare
is
W = U − ψX, ψ > 0.
These are the only two relevant terms, since: (i) the disutility of labor employed in
production and in research is exactly compensated by their wage payments; (ii) these
wages, plus firms’ profits (net of R&D costs) are entirely consumed by individuals,
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so that total income equals total spending on the goods produced. From the above
propositions, it follows that:
Proposition 5. (a) For κ ∈ [κ1, κ2 − κ1/2], net social welfare W increases monoton-
ically with competition; more generally, there is κ̂ > κ2 such that, for all κ ∈ [κ1, κ̂] ,
W is maximized at ∆ = 1; (b) W increases with the strength of consumers’ envi-
ronmental preferences δ if and only if competition is strong enough, ∆ ≥ ∆W , where
∆W < ∆U ; (c) If κ ≥ 2κ1, the effects of preferences and competition are complemen-
tary, ∂2W/∂∆∂δ > 0.
2.7 Predictions
Proposition 1 states three main predictions we should confront in the data. First, green
innovation increases with the degree of consumers’ social responsibility. Second, green
innovation increases with the extent of competition. Finally, environmental values and
market competition are complementary forces in inducing more green innovations.
3 Empirical Strategy
We now turn to testing empirically the model’s key comparative-statics predictions for
R&D. Specifically, we relate the extent to which firms innovate in a clean direction to
firm-specific measures of exposure to pro-environmental values and to competition. We
thus run regressions of the following form, where α, β and γ are the main coefficients
of interest:
Innovationj,t = αV aluesj,t + βCompetitionj,t + γV aluesj,t × Competitionj,t
+ δXj,t + Jj + Tt + εj,t (13)
In our preferred specification, Innovationj,t is the number of clean patents that firm
j filed in period t, relative to dirty ones, measured as log(1+number of clean patents)
− log(1+number of dirty patents).9 We also show results on clean and dirty patents
separately. Jj are firm fixed effects, and Tt period fixed effects for t = 1998-2002 or
2008-2012. We restrict the analysis to these two periods because of data constraints for
9If a firm files the same innovation with with patent offices in several countries we only count one
innovation; i.e. effectively we count so called patent families rather than individual patents.
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pro-environmental attitudes (see below). Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
V aluesj,t is a firm-specific measure of exposure to pro-environmental values. It is





where valuesc,t is the prosocial level in country c period t and ωj,c is our measure of
the importance of country c for firm j. This approach follows and expands on that
of Aghion et al. (2016). In theory one could use the firms’ expected sales or profits
in each country to infer the weights ωj,c, but such data is not available. We therefore
compute it instead using patenting activity from PATSTAT in a pre-period of analysis,
based on the principle that protecting intellectual property is more worthwhile where
one expects its market to be larger. Aghion et al. (2016) show that this approach
yields weights that are very correlated with sales for the firms for which sales data
broken down by country are available. More precisely, we define ωj,c as the share of
patents filed in country c by firm j, between 1950 and 1995. We restrict attention to
the 41 countries for which we have data on both environmental values and competition
(for some of the robustness checks using alternative data sources, the set of countries
has to be restricted to 25). We show robustness to various alternative definitions of
the weights and in particular to recent refinements of this approach by Dechezlepretre
et al. (2019)
Our main competition measure for firm j in period t is also similarly defined as a
weighted average of country-level indicators. For a subset of firms, we can use a direct
firm-level measure of competition that can essentially be interpreted as a Lerner index
(see below). Finally, the Xj,t are controls, including GDP, population, (tax-inclusive)
oil prices and in some specification environmental policies. They are also defined for
each firm as a weighted average of country-level variables, with weights computed as
above.
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4 Data sources and summary statistics
4.1 Innovation data
Our innovation measures come from patents in the car industry, as in Aghion et al.
(2016). Compared to R & D investment, patents are available at a very technologically
disaggregated level and can thus be classified as clean or dirty. Moreover the auto sec-
tor is an innovation-intensive sector, where patents are perceived as an effective means
of protection against imitation, something that is not true in all sectors (Cohen et al.,
2000). Any given innovation is typically patented in multiple countries. However, the
PATSTAT database maintained by the European Patent Office allows us to track all
individual patents belonging to the same patent family. A patent family identifies an
inventive step that is subsequently patented several times with different patent offices.
We use this to count families rather than patents, and refer to a family as an innovation.
To classify innovations as clean or dirty, we rely on the International Patent Classifica-
tion system (IPC) and on the “Y02 classification system” introduced by the European
Patent Office in 2002 to identify innovations that are relevant to mitigate climate im-
pact and which was also applied retrospectively for patents predating its introduction10.
Clean innovations are those related to non-fossil-fuel-based methods of propulsion, such
as electric or hydrogen cars and related technologies (e.g. batteries), while dirty inno-
vations consist of those related to the internal-combustion engine. We define as grey
technologies those that improve the efficiency of the internal combustion engine. The
exact IPC and Y02 codes used to identify clean, dirty and grey technologies can be
found in appendix Table A1. Car-related innovations that do not fit in any of these
three categories are labelled as “other”. We checked the robustness of our results to
various treatments of the “other” and “grey” categories.
Figure 2 shows the worldwide time-series evolution of car-related innovations since the
1960s. The annual number has grown from around 3,000 in the 1960s to over 40,000 in
2010. Up until 2000, this growth is mostly driven by patents in the “other” category,
while since 2000 there has also been a very rapid growth of clean patents. Indeed if




Figure 2: Evolution over time of clean, dirty, grey and other car related innovations




























1960 1980 2000 2020
Year
Share of clean Share of dirty
Share of grey Share of other
Among all car-related innovations
Share of clean, dirty, grey and other
Source: PATSTAT. Patents classified as clean, dirty, grey or other based on the IPC and Y02
classification systems. See main text for more details.
our analysis, the number of dirty innovations has remained roughly constant at around
4,000 per year while the number of clean innovations has increased from 1,600 per year
in the first period to 7,400 in the second one. Thus, the share of dirty innovations
declined from 20% in the early 2000s to just above 10% towards the end of our sample
period, while the share of clean ones rose from 7% to 20% (despite a reversal in the
last two years of our data).
Our sample consists of all firms in the car industry who patented at least once during
either the first period of analysis (1998-2002) or the second one (2008-2012).11 This
gives us 8,562 firms, out of which 2,130 patented in both periods. In 1998-2002, condi-
tional on patenting, the average number of innovations per firm is 2.3 clean ones and
6.1 dirty ones, while in 2008-2012 these figures are respectively 6 and 3.7. On average,
firm level growth rates between the 2 periods is 34% for clean patents 4% for dirty
patents.
11The gap in-between is due to the fact that environmental willingness-to-pay questions were asked
across countries only during these two periods. We thus take five-year windows centered on 2000 and
2010, and sum up a firm’s patents (available annually) over each of them.
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4.2 Environmental values data
The data on attitudes comes from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) and
the World Value Survey (WVS). Several questions could capture the pro-environment
values we are interested in, but they are often asked only in a limited set of coun-
tries during a single survey wave. The one question that is common to both surveys
and allows us to cover many countries for 2 time periods is the following (as stated
in the ISSP): “How willing would you be to pay much higher taxes in order to protect
the environment?” Answers vary from 1 (‘very willing’) to 5 (‘very unwilling’) and we
reverse-code them, so that a higher value means a more pro-environmental attitude. In
the WVS, the corresponding question is: “Can you tell me whether you strongly agree,
agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following statement: ‘I would agree to an
increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent environmental pollution’.”
Answers are 1 (‘strongly agree’), 2 (‘agree’), 4 (‘disagree’) and 5 (‘strongly disagree’).
We code as 3 the ‘don’t know’ answers and reverse-code the others, as for the ISSP, so
that a higher value means a more pro-environmental attitude.
Because taxes pertain to public policy more directly than to consumer spending deci-
sions, we also use one additional variable from each survey to create a pro-environment
index. For ISSP, the question is: “How willing would you be to pay much higher prices
in order to protect the environment?”. For the WVS, it is about (dis)agreement with
the statement: “I would give part of my income if I were certain that the money would
be used to prevent environmental pollution”. Answers are again reverse coded to en-
sure consistency. We then average all variables at the country-period level, transform
them into z-scores, and eventually average across all variables available for the country-
period observation. We thus have data on willingness-to-pay for the environment for
41 countries for 2 periods, namely 2000 and 2010 12.
In most countries, pro-environmental values have decreased over this period. This is
not a specificity of the datasets we are using, nor of the exact point in time at which
our attitude variables were measured. Indeed, Figure 3 provides a time-series plot of
average answers to another environmental preferences question, asked by the Gallup
survey to US respondents. We see that the prevailing trend from the early 1990s to the
12Note that this covers most major economies, and in particular most countries in which firms
innovating in the automotive sector reside, although there are a few notable exceptions such as Italy
and Spain.
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beginning of the 2010 decade has been a sharp reduction in environmental concerns.
The reasons for this decline are unclear, and there is even little awareness yet of this
fact in the literature. Gallup conjectures that environmental preferences increase when
the unemployment rate decreases and vice versa, but although this explanation may
hold for the US it does not fit well for other countries. Figure 3 also shows a sharp
reversal after our period of analysis. Although we do not have such recent data for
other countries, we hypothesize that this might be a more general trend. Therefore in
the last section of the paper, we will forecast what our estimates would imply in terms
of green innovations if the decrease in environmental values during the first decade of
the 2000s was totally erased by the more recent uptake in environmental concerns
Figure 3: Long run decline and recent reversal in pro-environmental concerns
Source: “Preference for Environment Over Economy Largest Since 2000”, by Lydia Saad for
Gallup News, April 2019
In our data, the countries that experienced the strongest decrease in our pro-environmental
index between 2000 and 2010 are the Netherlands, Poland, Ireland, Croatia and the
Czech Republic, while France, Germany, Korea, Moldovia and Lituania had the biggest
increase. In terms of levels, the 5 countries with the highest score in 2000 were Switzer-
land, the Netherlands, Denmark, Israel and Greece, while ten years later it was Korea,
Denmark, Switzerland, Greece and Moldovia. The lowest ones were Lituania, France,




To measure competition, we use two approaches. The first one relies on country-level
measures, which we aggregate at the firm level using the same weights as for the envi-
ronmental values; the second one is a direct firm-level measure of competition, but it
is available only for a subset of firms.
Our main country-level competition indicator is the World Bank’s oppenness measure,
defined as imports + exports divided by GDP. The most open countries in both pe-
riods are Ireland, Luxembourg and some Eastern European nations, while the least
open are Japan, the US, Argentina and Turkey. In terms of change between the 2
periods, Luxembourg and Eastern Europe saw the biggest increases in openness, while
the largest decreases were observed in Canada, Norway, Russia and New Zealand. We
also use, for robustness checks, the Product Market Regulation (PMR) indicator from
the OECD (Koske and Barbiero, 2015). It is a comprehensive variable that aggregates
responses from a questionnaire of over 700 questions, falling into three main areas:
state control, barriers to entrepreneurship, and barriers to trade and investment. We
use it for robustness and not as our benchmark measure, because it does not cover as
many countries and years as the World Bank measure. The openness measure and the
OECD competition measure correlate with a coefficient of 0.3. Indeed some countries
rank very differently along the two measures, like the US which are among the least
open according to the World Bank but the most competitive besides Great Britain
according to the OECD.
Of course, these country-level measures of openness or regulation are only imperfect
proxies for the actual levels of competition that firms in the auto sector are facing. To
compute a more direct firm-level measure, we rely on a Lerner-Index-style approach,
which we derive from a structural production-function regression. Compared to a
standard Lerner Index, this allows for non-constant returns to scale, as well as quasi-
fixed production factors. A detailed description of the methodology can be found in
Appendix B. This approach requires using balance-sheet data from another dataset
(ORBIS), and the merge between ORBIS data and our main patent data is only pos-
sible for a subset of firms.
The firm-level measure that focuses more specifically on the automobile sector displays
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much less heterogeneity in trends than the country-level indicators. Panel (a) of Figure
4 shows deciles of the distribution of markups over marginal costs – i.e., the inverse of
the Lerner Index – across firms. It indicates that markups (and thus competition) have
been flatlining over time, with the exception of the top decile, where we see an upward
trend from 2003 onwards. Panel (b) shows changes in market power for continuing
firms between 2002 and 2012. Thus, for the majority of automobile firms, the general
picture is that of a reduction in market power during that time period 13.
Figure 4: Firm-level Markups
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Notes: Panel (a) shows centiles (10th to 90th percentile) of firm-level markups (inverse
of the Lerner index) over time. Panel (b) show the distribution of changes in markups
between 2002 and 2012. These markups are computed using ORBIS data.
4.4 Country-level controls
We use several other country-level annual data sources to get control variables: end-
user, tax-inclusive automotive fuel prices from the International Energy Agency (IEA),
GDP from the World Bank (in constant 2010 US dollars), and population from the
IMF World Economic Outlook database. In some specifications we also control for
environmental policies with the Environmental Policy Stringency (EPS) Index from the
OECD, which provides a comprehensive measure of the extent of environment-related
13These observations are interesting in light of recent discussions about so called superstar firms
(e.g. Autor & al., 2017). While panel (a) would seem broadly supportive of the idea that some firms
at the top of the distribution were able to gain increasing amounts of market power, panel (b) suggests
that this could be the result of compositional changes, that is, firms with low market power exiting
along with weaking market power in remaining firms.
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regulations, taxes, tarifs and R&D subsidies 14. All these country-level indicators are
transformed into firm-level variables through the same weighting approach as for the
main regressors
4.5 Patent portfolio weights
Most of the variables used in the analysis are constructed using the weights we assign
to each country, for each firm. Thus it is quite critical to show robustness to various
definitions. Our benchmark definition is the share of patents deposited in the various
countries over the period 1950-1990. We do not restrict attention to only clean or dirty
patents, nor to patents related to automobile, rather we include all patents of the firm
in the countries used for the analysis. In the robustness checks, we show results when
we include only car-related patents, or when we include only patents with at least one
citation, which are supposed to be more meaningful patents.
However, based on the idea that large countries probably matter a lot even for firms
that did not patent there in the pre-period, we also use an alternative definition, which





Following Dechezlepretre et al. (2019), we also show results where we use GDP to the
power 0.35. The idea is that larger markets attract more firms so that the market size
per firm will generally not grow 1 for 1 with country size 16.
More than half of firms in our sample did not patent in the pre-period in the relevant
set of countries. We assign them uniform weights for each country, but also show
results when we drop them or assign them for each country the average weight among
firms that did patent in the pre-period. We implement the uniform weights by adding
1 to the number of patents a firm in a given country. This ensures a smooth transition
14For more details see https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=EPS
15We also checked robustness with using GDP per capita instead of GDP, but it seems that market
size is what matters most
16Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2011) estimate the elasticity of French exports to GDP of the
destination country to be 1 and the elasticity of the number of French exporters to be 0.65. This gives
an elasticity of the average export by firm of 0.35
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between firms with and without pre-sample patents.17 However, we check robustness
with and without this transformation.
Whatever the definition, the US has the largest weight, on average between 7 and 16%
depending on the definition, followed by Germany, Japan, the UK and then France.




Table 1 reports our benchmark results from specification (13). Panel A shows the main
effects of pro-environmental values and of competition on the direction of innovation
in the car industry. Panel B adds an interaction term between values and competition.
The difference between each column is in the dependent variable. While column (1)
shows our main outcome of interest, namely the growth rate of clean innovation relative
to dirty, column (2) and (3) report the effects on clean and dirty innovation separately.
Finally, columns (4) and (5) respectively use as outcomes grey innovation and all the
“other” car-related innovation not classified as either clean, dirty or grey.
We see that “greener” consumer values push innovation in the clean direction, by re-
ducing the rate of growth of dirty innovations. Competition has a strong significant
positive effect on clean innovation, but it actually increases all types of innovation.
Thus, although the effect is stronger on clean than dirty, the difference is not statisti-
cally significant. Panel B shows that the interaction between values and competition
has a significant positive effect on the growth rate of clean innovations, both in absolute
(column 2) and relative to dirty innovations (column 1).
To facilitate the interpretation of magnitudes, all variables are z-scores. Using es-
timates from column 1’s panel B, we see that a one-standard-deviation increase in
exposure to pro-environmental values is associated with a growth rate of clean patents
14% higher than that of dirty patents, at the mean level of competition. This effect
increases to 17% for levels of competition one standard deviation higher than the mean.
17Suppose a firm holds only patent in one country A (in the pre-period). In our main specification
this firm would be assigned weights that are very similar to a firm without patents. In the alternative
specification, the weight for country A would be equal to 1 whereas all other weights are equal to 0.
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As expected from Aghion et al. (2016), an increase in fuel prices is also associated with
a higher growth rate of clean patents relative to dirty ones.
The model outlined above had three comparative statics, out of which only two find
strong support in the data. Pro-environmental values push innovation in the clean
direction, all the more so that competition is high. The effect of competition on its
own is however a bit more ambiguous since it fosters innovations in general, with a
small but insignificant advantage towards cleaner innovations.
5.2 Robustness checks
Table 2 shows robustness to various weights definitions. Column 1 is the same as col-
umn 1 of panel B in Table 1, which is our benchmark. In column 2, we incorporate
countries’ GDPs in the weight definition, to account for the fact that larger markets
matter more (see section 4.5). Column 3 is the same as column 2, except that GDP
is raised to the power 0.35. In Column 4 we do not add one to the patent stocks of
firms in each country. In column 5, we drop firms with no pre-period patenting activity
(who are otherwise assigned uniform weights). In column 6 we assign these firms the
average weight obtained for firms who did patent in the pre-period. Column 7 and 8
restrict the set of patents from the pre-period used to compute the weights: in col-
umn 7 only car-related patents are considered, while in column 8 only patents with at
least one citation are included. Results are very consistent across specifications, with a
significant positive effect on clean innovation of values and of the interaction between
values and competition. The magnitudes are quite similar, although column 4 yields
a smaller coefficient for the main effect of values, while columns 6 through 8 yield a
larger one.
Table 3 shows that our results are robust to controlling for environmental policies.
This table reproduces panel B of Table 1, with the Environmental Policy Stringency
Index of the OECD as additional control. This new variable is only available for 25
countries, hence we have to recompute the weights within this smaller set of countries.
As was already the case in Aghion et al. (2016), environmental policies do not appear
to be a significant determinant of innovations: the coefficient of the EPS index on the
growth rate of clean innovations relative to that of dirty ones is insignificant. More
importantly, we see that this new control hardly affects the positive significant coef-
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ficient of values and that of the interaction between competition and values. But it
makes the competition effects on all types of innovations besides the grey ones become
insignificant.
Table 4 shows robustness to alternative measures of competition or values. Column 1
is the benchmark, identical to column 1 of Table 2. In column 2 we use the “higher
tax” question only, instead of our index, to proxy for the willingness-to-pay for the
environment. In column 3 we use the firm-level Lerner type measure of competition,
while in column 4 we use the OECD Product Market Regulation measure. The positive
effect of values on clean innovations relative to dirty ones remains very robust to all
these changes, despite the control for environmental policies. The effect of competi-
tion is insignificant across columns and that of the interaction term between values and
competition is positive and significant, or marginally so, except in the last specification.
Table 5 shows robustness to alternative treatment of the “grey” and “other” categories.
Grey refers to patents which make the ICE cleaner, which is neither perfectly clean nor
totally dirty. “Other” are innovations that arguably can be classified as “dirty”. In our
benchmark specifications we drop the grey and other patents but in this table we show
results when they are included. In column (1), grey is included in the dirty category,
in column (2) it is included in the clean category and in column (3) dirty consists of
dirty, grey and other patents. We see that these changes do not affect results much
except when grey is classified as clean, we find a strong significant coefficient for the
main effect of competition.
6 Accouting and counterfactual exercises
Our results show that more prosocial attitudes, especially when leveraged by increased
competition, tilt the direction of technology towards the development of cleaner prod-
ucts. While these results are significant, the question remains how economically rele-
vant the effects are.
First, we consider the changes between our two sampling periods, i.e. 1997-2002 (Pe-
riod 1) vs 2007-2012 (Period 2). As we can see from Table 6, the share of clean
innovations increased by nearly 24 percentage points (from 18 to 42 percent) while
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the share of dirty innovations decreased by over 20 percentage points. How can this
be reconciled with the fact that citizens in our sample countries generally became less
concerned with environmental priorities between 2000 and 2010 (see Table 7)? The
answer to the puzzle is two-fold. First, and predictably, during that period there was
a sharp rise in (tax-inclusive) fuel prices, which on its own induces some substitution
towards cleaner automotive products. Second, and more interestingly, the trend in
environmental concerns was quite different across countries, and in fact a favorable
one in those countries that mattered the most for innovation during that period. As
a result of this key compositional effect, which also demonstrates the importance of a
disaggregated analysis, the relevant changes in environmental attitudes between 1998
and 2012 actually made an important positive contribution to making the overall mix
of patents cleaner, both on their own and when amplified by changes in competition,
even though the unweighted index of those attitudes declined.
Using our fitted model, we examine what would have happened if the only thing that
changed between periods 1 and 2 were the observed changes in social attitudes. We
find that the clean innovation share would have increased by 5.7 percentage points,
whereas the dirty innovation share would have decreased by 4.6 p.p. (see column 2
of Table 6), despite an average decline in the unweighted pro-environmental attitude
index. Analogously, Column 3 of Table 6 considers what would have happened if the
only change between period 1 and 2 was the observed changes in competition. Again
we see an increase of the clean innovation share (by 7 percentage points) and a reduc-
tion of the dirty innovation share (by 7.3 p.p.). Moreover, in column 4 we observe that
the combined effect of the change in attitudes, the change in competition and their
interaction increases the clean innovation share by 7.4 percentage points. In other
words: the combined effect of the change in attitudes and the change in competition
accounts for more than one third of the observed changes in the clean innovation share.
Column 5, finally, considers the combined impact of social attitude, competition and
price changes. This amounts to an increase of the clean share by 29 pcps; i.e. more
than the actual changes. We can consequently infer that other factors (possibly, the
Great Recession) must have had a dampening effect on the shift towards clean.
In Table 8, we consider a different, prospective, scenario. We examine what would
happen if - given the period 2 values - we observed a further increase in both com-
petition and prosocial attitudes. To simulate the effect of realistic changes, we take
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the average absolute change seen between period 1 and 2 (see Table 7), that is, 0.74
standard deviations for prosocial values and 0.91 standard deviations for competition.
For prosocial values, the historical change between the two periods was a decrease and
we will now simulate the effect of a reversal of this decrease, whereas for competition
the historical change was already an increase and we will consider a further increase
of the same magnitude. We find that a uniform 0.74 standard deviation increase in
prosocial attitudes alone increases the clean share by 1.8 percentage points (compared
to period two values). A 0.91 standard deviation increase in competition alone raises it
by 2 percentage points. The combined effect of both changes is a 4.3 percentage point
increase in the clean share.
It is instructive to compare these changes with the equivalent (uniform) change in fuel
prices that would induce the same overall effect (see row 2 of Table 8). The simultane-
ous changes in attitudes and competition just described is equivalent to an increase of
40% in fuel prices world wide. Given the often dramatic public responses against even
moderate attempts to increase fuel prices (e.g. “Gilet Jaunes”) this suggests that grass-
roots and public campaigns to promote citizens’ environmental responsibility could be




Are citizens’ oft-stated desires to adopt more environmentally responsible behaviors
just “cheap talk”, or conversely powerful motivations that end up having a major in-
fluence on what new products will be developed and sold? And what is the potential
role of market competition in the process? To answer these questions, we brought
together patent data, survey data on environmental values, and competition data, to
analyze the joint effect of consumers’ social responsibility and product-market com-
petition on automotive firms’ decision whether to innovate clean or dirty. We found
supporting evidence for the idea that pro-environment attitudes and its interaction
with competition both have a significantly positive effect on the probability for a firm
to aim at cleaner patents. Our results are robust to a broad set of indicators for
environmental values and product market competition.
More generally, the results provide support for models in which intrinsically and repu-
tationally motivated individuals incur costs to act in a “socially responsible” manner”
in spite of having a negligible impact on the aggregate outcome, such as pollution.
When further leveraged by strong competition between firms, moreover, such proso-
cial motivations can actually “move markets”, even at the upstream stage of product
research and development.
Although the empirical part of our analysis remains more positive than normative,
its findings also suggest that a conjunction of educational policies aimed at increasing
consumers’ environmental awareness, together with a more active competition policy,
can be quite effective, all the more so when direct instruments such as fuel or carbon
taxes face strong popular opposition. In particular, our empirical analysis suggests
that the combination of historically realistic increases in both prosocial attitudes and
product market competition (respectively 1 and 0.75 standard deviations) would have
the same effect on green innovation as a 40% increase in fuel prices worldwide. Further
amplifying effects are likely in the long run, as formal laws simultaneously respond to,
and in return shape, the evoluation of societal values and norms (Bénabou and Tirole
2011; Ali and Bénabou 2020)
This paper should be seen as a first step in a broader research agenda. First, it
would be interesting to extend the empirical analysis beyond the car manufacturing
industry for instance to the energy sector. Second, one could investigate the effect of
shareholders’ and other investors’ social responsibility on green innovation. These and
other extensions are left for future research.
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Tables
Table 1: The effect of Values and Competition on the direction of innovation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES log (1+ #clean) log (1+ #clean) log (1+ #dirty) log (1+ #grey) log (1+ #other)
- log (1+ #dirty)
Panel A: Values and Competition main effects
Values 0.107*** 0.00473 -0.103*** -0.0191 -0.136***
(0.0211) (0.0191) (0.0179) (0.0157) (0.0239)
Competition 0.269 0.514*** 0.246* 0.381*** 0.555***
(0.166) (0.144) (0.128) (0.108) (0.162)
Log fuel price 0.965*** 0.784*** -0.181 -0.0386 0.603***
(0.156) (0.138) (0.127) (0.114) (0.161)
Observations 17,124 17,124 17,124 17,124 17,124
R-squared 0.122 0.179 0.026 0.052 0.050
Number of firms 8,562 8,562 8,562 8,562 8,562
Panel B: Adding interaction term between Values and Competition
Values 0.141*** 0.0350 -0.106*** -0.0276 -0.0859***
(0.0270) (0.0230) (0.0225) (0.0200) (0.0289)
Competition 0.167 0.422*** 0.255** 0.406*** 0.403**
(0.165) (0.140) (0.126) (0.107) (0.161)
ValuesXComp 0.0296** 0.0268** -0.00278 -0.00750 0.0441***
(0.0136) (0.0116) (0.0110) (0.00994) (0.0139)
Log fuel price 0.596*** 0.450*** -0.146 0.0549 0.0527
(0.171) (0.149) (0.154) (0.140) (0.215)
Observations 17,124 17,124 17,124 17,124 17,124
R-squared 0.123 0.180 0.026 0.052 0.053
Number of firms 8,562 8,562 8,562 8,562 8,562
Note: Besides the coefficients shown, all specifications control for log of population and log of GDP
and include firm fixed effects and a period fixed effect. Values, Competition and log of fuel prices are
standardized as z-scores.
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Table 2: Robustness to different weights definition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES log (1+ #clean) - log (1+ #dirty)
Values 0.141*** 0.139*** 0.121*** 0.0418** 0.168*** 0.503*** 0.546*** 0.286***
(0.0270) (0.0263) (0.0304) (0.0177) (0.0314) (0.0998) (0.180) (0.0737)
Competition 0.167 0.118 0.0103 0.0747 0.173 0.323* 0.115 0.460
(0.165) (0.182) (0.218) (0.0703) (0.181) (0.165) (0.485) (0.284)
ValuesXComp. 0.0296** 0.0319** 0.0303* 0.0525*** 0.0430** 0.150*** 0.113** 0.0903***
(0.0136) (0.0143) (0.0170) (0.0130) (0.0191) (0.0396) (0.0478) (0.0329)
Log fuel price 0.596*** 0.559*** 0.519*** 0.0998 0.643*** -0.492 0.613 0.552**
(0.171) (0.160) (0.152) (0.0647) (0.186) (0.901) (0.467) (0.278)
Observations 17,124 17,124 17,124 17,124 6,704 17,124 17,124 17,124
R-squared 0.123 0.122 0.121 0.102 0.176 0.121 0.121 0.120
Number of firms 8,562 8,562 8,562 8,562 3,352 8,562 8,562 8,562
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Table 3: Robustness to controlling for environmental policies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES log (1+ #clean) log (1+ #clean) log (1+ #dirty) log (1+ #grey) log (1+ #other)
- log (1+ #dirty)
Values 0.109*** 0.00174 -0.107*** -0.0474*** -0.112***
(0.0242) (0.0197) (0.0213) (0.0181) (0.0294)
Competition -0.0123 0.265 0.277 0.435*** 0.378
(0.215) (0.174) (0.201) (0.161) (0.264)
ValuesXComp 0.0224** 0.0231** 0.000670 -0.00718 0.0376***
(0.0106) (0.00924) (0.00879) (0.00793) (0.0116)
Log fuel price 0.559*** 0.245* -0.314** -0.0648 -0.234
(0.167) (0.144) (0.148) (0.130) (0.210)
EPS 0.235 0.161 -0.0743 0.0615 -0.237
(0.146) (0.120) (0.138) (0.111) (0.198)
Observations 17,124 17,124 17,124 17,124 17,124
R-squared 0.121 0.180 0.025 0.052 0.050
Number of firms 8,562 8,562 8,562 8,562 8,562
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Table 4: Robustness to alternative value and competition measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log (1+ #clean) - log (1+ #dirty)
Values 0.109*** 0.153*** 0.177*** 0.102***
(0.0242) (0.0500) (0.0421) (0.0250)
Competition -0.0123 0.283 0.00387 0.00949
(0.215) (0.223) (0.0319) (0.124)
ValuesXCompetition 0.0224** 0.0546** 0.0658* 0.0162
(0.0106) (0.0217) (0.0352) (0.0161)
Log fuel price 0.559*** 0.402 1.416* 0.722***
(0.167) (0.269) (0.731) (0.258)
EPS 0.235 0.398*** 0.124 0.328**
(0.146) (0.150) (0.256) (0.148)
Competition measure World Bank World Bank Lerner OECD
Values measure Index Higher Tax Index Index
Observations 17,124 17,124 2,706 17,124
R-squared 0.121 0.120 0.199 0.120
Number of firms 8,562 8,562 1,854 8,562
Note: Besides the coefficients shown, all specifications control for log of population and
log of GDP and include firm fixed effects and a period fixed effect. For the coefficients
shown in the table, variables are standardized as z-scores.
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Table 5: Robustness to alternative treatment of the “grey” and “other” categories
(1) (2) (4)
VARIABLES log (1+ #clean) - log (1+ #dirty)
Values 0.175*** 0.0590** 0.188***
(0.0283) (0.0245) (0.0205)
comp -0.210 0.498*** -0.210
(0.182) (0.170) (0.140)
ValuesXCompetition 0.0407*** 0.00756 0.0177**
(0.0142) (0.0118) (0.00787)
Log fuel price 0.413** 0.645*** -0.0456
(0.196) (0.160) (0.164)
Clean clean clean + grey clean
Dirty dirty + grey dirty dirty + grey + other
Observations 17,124 17,124 49,482
R-squared 0.070 0.149 0.051
Number of firms 8,562 8,562 24,741
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Clean Share 23.80 5.70 7.00 7.40 29.00 -5.20
Dirty Share -20.70 -4.60 -7.30 -7.60 -23.90 3.20
Grey Share -3.20 -1.20 0.20 0.00 -5.20 2.00
Notes: The table reports how much of the historic changes (comparing the 1997-2002 with the
2007-2012 period) in the shares of different technologies we can attribute to different factors
according to our regressions reported in Table 1. Column 1 reports the actual change; e.g. the share
of clean innovations increased by 23.8 percentage points (pcps). A change of 5.70 pcps would have
happened if social attitudes only had changed between the two periods. Competition, social
attitudes and fuel prices changes combined imply an increase of 29 pcps. As this is larger than the
actual change we can infer that other factors must have had a dampening effect on clean innovation
amounting to a reduction of 5.20 pcps of the clean share.
Table 7: Descriptive statistics for counterfactual exercises
mean p5 p50 p95
∆Social -0.74 -1.65 -0.91 0.54
∆Competition 0.86 0.55 0.91 0.94
∆logFuelPrice 1.70 1.60 1.60 2.25
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∆Social = 0.74 Due to
∆Comp = 0.86
Due to
∆Social = 0.74 &
∆Comp = 0.86
Clean Share 1.80 2.00 4.30
Equivalent price growth in % 14.00 16.00 40.00
Notes: The table reports the effect of a uniform increasing in the social attitude and competition
scores equivalent to the average absolute change we observed in those variables between the earlier
and later sample period on the the share of clean innovation (Row 1). Row 2 shows the equivalent
change in fuel prices triggering the same response.
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Appendix A. Proofs of Proposition 2 and 3












































< 1 + πM − 2κ,





























≡ ∆̂X(κ, γ, δ).
(17)




















where κ2 > κ1 = πM was given in equation (11). It then follows that (under the
maintained assumption that κ > κ1, ensuring an interior optimum for z) :
(i) If κ < κ2 − κ1/2, Z is decreasing in ∆, and thus minimized at ∆ = 1.
(ii) If κ > κ2 + κ1/2, then Z is increasing in ∆, and thus minimized at ∆ = 1/2.
(iii) If κ ∈ (κ2 − κ1/2, κ2 + κ1/2) then X is hump-shaped in ∆, with a maximum at
∆̂Z(γ, δ) ∈ (1/2, 1) and a minimum either at 1/2 or at 1, depending on κ ≷ κ2 (recall
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that this is what defines κ2).
Note, finally, that conditions κ > πM and κ < κ2 − πM/2 define a nonempty interval
when 3πM < 2κ2, that is, γ
−δ (2− 1/γ) > 1, or
δ < ln (2− 1/γ) / ln γ.  (20)




















The last two terms are clearly negative, and so is the first, since (1− πM) /γ < 1−πM ≤
1−2(1−∆)πM for all ∆ ≥ 1/2. Recalling that πM = 1−γ−δ, it follows that ∂X/∂δ < 0.
When κ ≤ κ1, R&D effort may be (depending on ∆) at a corner, z = 1, in which case
X = yM/γ = 1/cγ
−δ−1, which decreases in δ.




= −4(1− 2πM)∆ +
1
γ








If 1 − 2πM ≥ 0, the right-hand side is bounded above by (1 − 2πM)/γ − 1 − 2κ <
1/γ− 1− 2κ < 0. If 1− 2πM < 0, it is bounded above by (2πM − 1) (2− 1/γ)− 1− 2κ,
since ∆ ≤ 1; but πM ≤ 1, so this expression is at most 1 − 1/γ − 2κ < 0, since
κ > κ1 = 1 − 1/γδ > 1 − 1/γ. Recalling that πM = 1 − γ−δ, we therefore have
∂2X/∂∆∂δ < 0 for all ∆,as long as κ > κ1. 
Proof or Proposition 4. Part (a) follows directly from Proposition 2 and 3. For (b)







































where f(t) ≡ ln(1 + t)/t for all t > 0 and f(0) ≡ limt→0 f(t) = 1. Note that f is a
decreasing function, since f ′(t) has the sign of g(t) ≡ t− (1 + t) ln(1 + t), where clearly
g′(t) < 0 = g(0) for all t > 0. The right-hand side of (24) is thus increasing in ∆, so
the inequality holds if and only if ∆ > ∆(πM , κ), with
∆(πM , κ) < 1 ⇐⇒ κ < 1 + πM , (25)










Condition (25) is always compatible with κ > πM and κ < κ2− πM/2. Condition (26),
which ensures that ∂U/∂πM > 0 for all values of ∆ ∈ [1/2, 1], is more demanding since















which holds for instance when πM is small enough, meaning that δ ln γ is small enough.



















Moreover, the first term is increasing in πM , and while the second not always is,
a sufficient condition is that (∆πM/κ) (1−∆πM/κ) be increasing, which occurs for
∆πM/κ < 1/2; conversely, πM/κ < 1/2 is necessary the second term for that same
term to be increasing in ∆ up to ∆ = 1. Thus, when κ > 2πM = 2κ1, we have
∂2U/∂∆∂δ > 0.
We check, finally, that this new lower bound on κ is compatible with key upper bounds
previously defined, meaning that they jointly define a nonempty set of values for
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(κ, γ, δ). We have


















The first condition is naturally tighter than (20), so when it holds we have ∂2U/∂∆∂δ >
0 for all ∆ and ∂U/∂δ > 0 for ∆ in some nonempty interval (∆, 1]. If the second
condition also holds (which is ensured by some additional upper bound on δ), then
∂2U/∂∆∂δ > 0 > ∂U/∂δ > 0 for all ∆ ∈ [1/2, 1]. 
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Appendix B. Computation of firm level Lerner Index
We estimate firm level measures of competition using a (revenue) production function








where ∆rit = lnRit− lnRit−1 (and equivalently for production factors) and we assume
a homothetic translog production function with materials Mit and labor Lit as flexible
factors and capital Kit a quasi fixed production factor. γ is a scale paramter. s̄Mit =
sMit+sMit−1
2
is the average share of materials expendisture in revenue between period t
and t − 1 (and equivalently for labor inputs). ω is a composite shock comprising of
a Hicks neutral production shifter (TFPQ) and a demand shifter. µ̄it is the average
markup of prices over marginal cost between period t and t − 1. Hence, µ̄it -1 is a





where αMit is the elasticity of output w.r.t to changes in production factor M (and
analougously for labor). Note that in the translog case
αMit = αM + αKMkit + αLM lit + αMMmit (33)
Note that the specification is consistent with a wide variaty of market structures. For











∆rit − γµ̄it + s̄Mit (∆mit −∆kit) + s̄Lit (∆lit −∆kit)
s̄Mit
Subject to assumptions about the evolution of the ∆ωit shock, we can fit this to stan-
dard firm level data using a GMM approach; e.g. suppose that ∆ωit follows an AR(1)
process so that
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ωit = ρωit−1 + ηit

















































After identifying δ, we can compute α̂Mit
γ










which is an inverse Lerner Index scaled by the returns to scale parameter γ; i.e. it
tells us the excess of markups over returns to scale. Hence, while this is different
from the markup over marginal costs this is the more relevant in terms of measuring
market power as it corresponds to the excess earnings over what would be reasonable
to compensate for increasing returns.
We also implement a simpler version assuming a Cobb Douglas production function
implying that αMit = αM . Both approaches lead to similar results.
Appendix C. Calculation of counterfactuals
We can write our regression model as
log (PATjt + 1) = Xjtb+ εjt
where PATjt is the number of patents (or patent families) of firm j at time t, Xjt
is a vector collecting all explanatory variables and b is a vector of coefficients. For
simplicity we abstract from different technology types. For an observed level of PATjt
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and Xjt and b̂an estimate of b, we can compute the counterfactual level of innovation
PATCFjt in response to a counterfactual change in the explanatory variables ∆X
CF
jt ,
We can express the counterfactual level of innovation for a given counterfactual change
in ∆XCFjt relative to an actual level Xjt as
PATCFjt = (PATjt + 1)× exp(∆XCFjt b̂)− 1
Hence, for all counterfactual scenarios reported in section XX we compute the counter-




Table A1: Patent CPC classification codes used
Clean
Y02T10/60 Other road transportation technologies with climate change mitigation effect
Y02T10/70 Energy storage for electromobility
Y02T90/10 Technologies related to electric vehicle charging
Y02T90/34 Fuel cell powered electric vehicles
Y02T90/42 Hydrogen as fuel for road transportation
Grey
Y02T10/10 Climate change mitigation technologies related to fuel injection
Y02T10/20 Climate change mitigation technologies related to exhaust after treatment
Y02T10/40 Climate change mitigation technologies related to engine Management Systems




B60 Vehicles in General
Notes: The table reports the Cooperative Patent Classification (CPC) classification used to
determine the different flavours of innovation.
https://www.cooperativepatentclassification.org/index
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